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Procedural Paradigms for Applying
the Daubert Test
Margaret A. Berger*
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the Supreme Court's 1993 opinion in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. I looks like a quin-
tessential opinion about evidence. It discards as incompatible
with the Federal Rules of Evidence the venerable Frye2 "general
acceptance" test for the admissibility of scientific proof and out-
lines a different evidentiary standard more in keeping with the
structure of the Rules. It would be simplistic and short-sighted,
however, to pigeonhole Daubert simply as an opinion about evi-
dence. Although Daubert interprets the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, reflects an evidentiary concern for accuracy in the
courtroom, and will probably appear in every evidence casebook,
its impact will in large measure be affected and mediated by the
procedural settings in which scientific evidence is proffered.
In both civil and criminal cases, implementing the Supreme
Court's message will require attention to numerous complex
procedural problems that the Court did not address. The
Court's opinion provides a framework for evaluating scientific
proof, but it does not supply a blueprint to guide the judge who
is discharging this task. This Article examines a number of dif-
ferent contexts in which courts may have to respond to scientific
evidence. It identifies procedural and policy objectives that
should inform a court's choice and procedural mechanisms that
might better enable courts to apply the Daubert Court's reason-
ing. This Article thus simultaneously seeks to elucidate the
meaning of Daubert and to examine values that may themselves
define the contours of the decision.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. LL.B. 1956, Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law. I wish to thank Edward J. Imwinkelried and Jeffrey Stem-
pel for the valuable comments they made on earlier drafts of this Article. I also
wish to thank my research assistant David Karp.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2. The test was first enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Article analyzes the Daubert opinion itself and
explores the various questions a court faces when determining
the admissibility of proffered scientific evidence.3 Part II consid-
ers various evidentiary issues that courts must resolve pursuant
to Daubert and the procedural mechanisms and goals that may
inform a court's decisions. The discussion focuses first on a
criminal case in which the prosecution offers evidence derived
from a novel forensic technique and then turns to civil litigation.
This Article concludes that although the Daubert Court
grounded its evidentiary analysis in Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which applies across the board to all civil and
criminal actions and proceedings, 4 distinctions between criminal
prosecutions and civil trials justify placing different burdens on
the parties with regard to preliminary determinations of the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence. Whereas the prosecution
should bear the burden of satisfying Daubert before novel scien-
tific evidence is admitted in a criminal trial, placing a burden on
the defendant in a civil case to demonstrate that a Daubert issue
exists comports with the goals of Daubert, furthers the scheme
of the new discovery rules, and advances efficiency concerns.
This discussion also examines a variety of situations in civil liti-
gation in which judicial determinations about procedural issues
are likely to affect the availability of scientific evidence and con-
siders possible solutions that accommodate evidentiary values
as well as fairness and efficiency concerns.
I. THE DAUBERT OPINION
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the plain-
tiffs claimed that Bendectin, a morning sickness remedy manu-
3. Daubert recognizes that even if the scientific evidence passes the ad-
missibility hurdle, a judge may be able to dispose of a civil case on the ground
that the evidence is insufficient. See discussion infra part II.B.4 (discussing
motion for summary judgment). Although this Article only addresses the ad-
missibility of evidence and not issues of sufficiency, sufficiency concerns may
affect admissibility determinations. A court may sidestep an admissibility
analysis when it is prepared to terminate the case on sufficiency grounds. See
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 169-70 (5th Cir.
1989) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting from a refusal to rehear a panel decision
granting judgment as a matter of law in a Bendectin case not on the merits but
because the court failed to address admissibility issue), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1046 (1990).
4. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides as follows: "If scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
1346 [Vol. 78:1345
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factured by the defendant, caused their congenital limb
reduction defects. 5 As a consequence of over two thousand simi-
lar suits brought in state and federal courts, Merrell Dow took
Bendectin, which had been a best selling drug used by over
thirty million women, off the market in 1983 even though it
never lost its FDA approval.6 By the time Daubert reached the
Supreme Court, lower courts had already resolved many of these
cases in favor of the defendant, either by jury verdict or because
the verdict for the plaintiff failed to survive post-trial motions or
appeal. 7
In the two lawsuits consolidated in Daubert, Merrell Dow
denied that Bendectin had caused the minor plaintiffs' birth de-
fects and moved for summary judgment.8 In support of its mo-
tion, the defendant submitted a two-page affidavit from an
epidemiologist who had concluded, after reviewing the entire
literature on Bendectin and human birth defects, that Bendectin
"is not a risk factor for human birth defects in general, for limb
reduction defects specifically, or for any other particular human
birth defect."9 The plaintiffs countered with equally conclusory
affidavits from eight experts in a variety of disciplines, supple-
mented with transcripts from depositions and from previous
trials.' 0
The district court found the studies on which the plaintiffs
relied insufficient to prove causation "in the face of the over-
5. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
6. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1350
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992).
7. The defendant has apparently never paid the one judgment for a plain-
tiff that survived post-trial motions. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litiga-
tion: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 379-80
(1992) (discussing Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d
1100 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571
(S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993). The plaintiffs originally filed suits in the California state court in 1984,
and the defendant removed the suits to federal court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
9. Affidavit of Dr. Steven H. Lamm, Joint Appendix at 33, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
10. 727 F. Supp. at 573. The plaintiffs' experts based their opinions on a
variety of data that scientists regularly utilize in testing new drugs: in vitro
studies which examined the effect of Bendectin on live cells in test tubes; in vivo
studies on animals which compared Bendectin-fed offspring with those not fed
Bendectin; chemical structural analyses which compared Bendectin with other
substances known to cause birth defects; and statistical reanalyses of the data
from published epidemiological studies. Id. at 574-75.
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whelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence.""- The
district court then granted summary judgment, noting that
plaintiffs' experts never disputed that all published epidemiolog-
ical studies had failed to find a statistically significant link be-
tween Bendectin and birth defects. 12 The court held that the
plaintiffs had not raised a material issue of fact by alleging that
unpublished reanalyses of epidemiological data would show that
Bendectin could have caused the plaintiffs' injuries. 13 Although
the district court mentioned Rules 703 and 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in passing, the court mainly focused on the
insufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence rather than its
inadmissibility.14
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the result below, but relied
primarily on the inadmissibility of the plaintiffs' expert testi-
mony-though it failed to cite a single federal evidentiary rule.15
The court began by reaffirming its adherence to the "general ac-
ceptance" test which the Circuit Court of the District of Colum-
bia had formulated seventy years earlier in Frye v. United
States.'6 The Frye standard focuses on whether "the thing from
which the [expert testimony is deduced is] sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs."' 7 The Ninth Circuit then explained that
three other circuits had already found the plaintiffs' non-epide-
11. Id. at 573.
12. Id. at 575.
13. Id. at 575-76.
14. Id. at 572.
15. 951 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Kozinski wrote the brief
opinion, which Charles Fried characterized as a summary affirmance when ar-
guing for respondent in the Supreme Court. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 92-102, official transcript at 39 ("a little breezy and a
little summary.").
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Although much criticized, a majority of
state and federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have invoked the Frye
standard when ruling on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Daubert,
113 S. Ct. at 2792-93.
17. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. A majority of the federal circuits and the states
claimed to use the "general acceptance" test to determine the admissibility of
scientific evidence. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792 ("the 'general acceptance'
test has been the dominant standard for determining admissibility") (citing
ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NEssoN, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 649 (1983)). Circuits used different formulae in articulating the
"general acceptance" test. Whether any differences in result were attributable
to these variations in the wording of the test is highly questionable, beyond the
scope of this Article, and probably of no great significance given the outcome of
Daubert. The Supreme Court cited to some of the extensive literature on Frye.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793 nn.3-5. A number of federal circuits had rejected
Frye as incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United
1348
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miological evidence insufficient to prove causation. Finally, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs' reanalyses of epidemiological
studies could not meet Frye admissibility standards: "[Tihey
were unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review pro-
cess and generated solely for use in litigation."18
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
proper standard for the admission of expert scientific evidence. 19
In a few short paragraphs, the Court swept the Frye "general
acceptance" test out of the federal courts. 20 Applying a plain
meaning approach to Rule 702 and to the Rules as a whole, the
Court unanimously concluded that "general acceptance" is a
"standard absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules
of Evidence."21
The Court could have ended its opinion at this point.22 In-
deed, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justice Stevens, while
acknowledging "that Rule 702 confides to the judge some
gatekeeping responsibility,"23 would have left the further devel-
opment of the law to future cases, and accordingly dissented
from the balance of the opinion. 24 Despite their colleagues' pro-
tests, however, six justices joined Justice Blackmun in broadly
sketching the federal judge's responsibilities when handling sci-
entific expert testimony pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.25
The majority termed "general acceptance" an unacceptably
"austere standard" 26 and deemed a jury capable of handling reli-
States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104
(1992); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
18. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131. The court noted that the Third Circuit in
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. had left open the possibility that
the plaintiffs' reanalyses might be admissible but declined to follow DeLuca be-
cause the Third Circuit had rejected Frye. Id. at 1130-31 n.2 (discussing
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1991)).
19. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
20. Id. at 2793-94.
21. Id. at 2794.
22. The Supreme Court remanded the case because the lower courts had
assumed the existence of a "general acceptance" standard in finding the plain-
tiffs' expert testimony inadmissible or insufficient. Id. at 2799.
23. Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. These two Justices objected to their colleagues' additional "general ob-
servations" as "vague and abstract" and raising scientific questions "far afield
from the expertise of judges." Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
25. Id. at 2795-98. The majority explained that '[wle believe the better
course is to note the nature and source of the duty." Id. at 2795 n.7.
26. Id. at 2794.
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able scientific evidence.27 Yet, the Court also confirmed the trial
judge's "gatekeeping" function pursuant to Rule 104(a)28 to
screen expert testimony that is not the product of scientific
thinking.29 The challenge of Daubert is to reconcile these twin
objectives-to honor the Federal Rules' liberal admissibility
standard for expert proof while blocking the entry of unreliable
scientific evidence into the courtroom.
The Court situated a judge's gatekeeping obligation in Rule
702 which contains the words "scientific" and "knowledge."30 It
concluded that "'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods
and procedures of science," whereas "the word 'knowledge' con-
notes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation."31
By requiring judges to focus on the scientific principles and
methodology underlying an expert's opinion, and "not on the
conclusions that they generate,"32 the Supreme Court sought to
ensure that "evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific
validity."33
To determine whether the expert's testimony about scien-
tific knowledge will assist the trier of fact in assessing a contro-
verted issue, Daubert requires the judge to ask two questions:
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testi-
mony is scientifically valid" and "whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."34 The
Court provided a checklist of factors that trial courts should con-
sider to determine whether the opinion is methodologically
sound, but cautioned that this list should not be considered de-
finitive.3 5 The first of these considerations is "falsifiabiity":
27. Id. at 2798.
28. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides as follows:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivi-
sion (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
In Bourjaily v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 104(a) to
mean that the admissibility of evidence must be established by a preponderance
of proof. 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).
29. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798-99.
30. Id. at 2795; see supra note 4 (quoting language of FED. R. EviD. 702).
31. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. When an expert seeks to testify pursuant
to Rule 702 about scientific knowledge, the inferences or assertions that the
expert is making "must be derived by the scientific method." Id.
32. Id. at 2797.
33. Id. at 2795 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
34. Id. at 2796.
35. Id. at 2796-97.
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that is, "whether a theory or technique... can be (and has been)
tested."36 The primacy of this factor and quotations in the opin-
ion indicate that the Court perceived science as an empirical en-
deavor.3 7 Courts should also determine "whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication."38
The Court rejected submission to peer review as dispositive, but
recognized that "submission to the scrutiny of the scientific com-
munity is a component of 'good science.'" 39
In addition, courts should analyze "the known or potential
rate of error... and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation."40 Further, the Daubert
Court noted that "general acceptance" in the scientific commu-
nity still bears on the inquiry.41 The Court agreed with the
Third Circuit that a technique that has garnered only minimal
support within the scientific community "may properly be
viewed with skepticism."42
In order to answer the second question-is the theory appli-
cable in this case-the trial court must also decide whether the
expert's testimony "fits" the facts of the case.43 This condition,
as the Court recognized, is essentially one of relevance. 44 The
"helpfulness" standard incorporated in Rule 702 means that the
expert's opinion must relate to an issue that is actually in dis-
pute and must provide a valid scientific connection to the perti-
nent inquiry.45
36. Id. at 2796.
37. Id. at 2796-97 (quoting CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL Sci-
ENCE 49 (1966)) ("The statements constituting a scientific explanation must be
capable of empirical test.").
38. Id. at 2797.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.
1985)).
43. Id. at 2796. The use of the word "fit" to describe this concept was first
used by Judge Becker in Downing. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985).
44. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGAPRT
A. BERGER, 3 WEmNsTENe's EVIDENCE 702[02], at 702-18) (1993)) ("Expert testi-
mony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo,
non-helpful.").
45. Id. at 2795-96. The Court offered an example of the expert whose sci-
entific training about the phases of the moon enables him to establish whether
it was dark on a particular night. Id. at 2796. If that is the issue, the expert's
testimony fits. Id. Yet, evidence that the moon was full on the night in ques-
tion does not assist the trier on the issue of whether an individual is likely to be
irrational when the moon is full. Id.
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The Daubert opinion contains some additional observations
that bear on the trial court's powers and responsibilities vis-a-
vis scientific evidence. Without discussion, the Court reminded
judges of other applicable rules and mentioned Rules 703, 706,
and 403.46 The Court further noted that scientific testimony
that passes the Daubert threshold for admissibility may still be
insufficient, leaving a trial judge free to grant summary judg-
ment or to direct a judgment pursuant to Rule 50(a).47 Finally,
the Court concluded by recognizing that the law's interest in as-
certaining the truth differs from that of the scientific commu-
nity.48 Even though "[s]cientific conclusions are subject to
perpetual revision," the need to "resolve disputes finally and
quickly" in a courtroom "inevitably on occasion will prevent the
jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations."49
II. THE PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF DAUBERT
A. THE CRIMNAL CASE: THE NOVEL FoRiENsic TECHNIQUE
1. Viewing Daubert in a Forensic Context
This discussion commences with criminal cases for a
number of reasons. First, in a criminal case, the central objec-
tive of litigation is clear: the accurate determination of the de-
fendant's guilt is the central concern which outweighs any other
possible procedural objective.50 The Daubert Court's effort to
ensure evidentiary reliability with regard to scientific evidence
would therefore appear most compelling in criminal prosecu-
tions. Nevertheless, the accused may be more handicapped in
challenging expert scientific proof proffered against him than
46. Id. at 2797-98.
47. Id. at 2798. The Daubert Court cited two Bendectin cases for this prop-
osition, Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.
1992) (summary judgment) and Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989) (judgment as a matter of law), modified, 884 F.2d
166 (5th Cir. 1989), and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990). Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. This concern is manifested through a variety of constitutional, eviden-
tiary, and procedural guarantees ranging from rights guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, the other crimes evidence rule embodied in Federal
Rule of Evidence 404 that hinges on the presumption of innocence, and the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)
(stating that "every individual going about his ordinary affairs [must] have con-
fidence that his government cannot find him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty").
1352 [Vol. 78:1345
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the civil litigant because of less extensive discovery rights,51
fewer resources, 52 and because the prosecution may have a
somewhat vested interest if it participated in creating and ap-
plying the forensic technique in question.53 Criminal cases are
therefore of interest as a baseline from which to evaluate how
courts should handle scientific evidence in civil cases. In a civil
case, in which neither side needs special protection against er-
rors of fact-finding, procedural mechanisms that are not avail-
able in a criminal case may be more consonant with the need for
reliable evidence.54
Further, the factors the Daubert Court discussed as bearing
on reliability and relevancy emerge particularly clearly in a
criminal case. The methodological problems on the Court's non-
definitive list are easier to comprehend in terms of a forensic
test to establish identity than in connection with scientific evi-
dence typically proffered to prove causation in toxic tort cases
such as Daubert. When faced with the admissibility of tests that
purport to match two substances, it is relatively easy to at least
grasp how concepts such as falsifiability and error rate relate in
determining whether a test can be validated and what it
proves. 55 Although the science underlying statistical issues may
be extremely complex, the significance of a statistical problem in
the particular case is not difficult to understand.56 In toxic tort
cases such as Daubert, understanding methodological and sta-
tistical issues with regard to epidemiological studies is consider-
ably more difficult. Dealing with these issues first in the
criminal context may illuminate the problems a court faces
when acting as a gatekeeper in civil litigation.
Finally, it is only fitting to start by revisiting forensic evi-
dence. The discredited Frye approach originated with this kind
51. Paul C. Gianelli, "Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRiM. L. &
CRUNOLOGY 105, 126 (1993).
52. Id. at 124-26.
53. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
54. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ("There is always in
litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both par-
ties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of tran-
scending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is
reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of
producing a sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
55. See discussion infra parts II.A.2.b-c.
56. How to resolve statistical issues may be considerably more difficult.
See discussion of the DNA debate infra at notes 75, 99 and accompanying text.
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of proof and was invoked primarily in criminal cases.5 7
Daubert's capacity to achieve better results than Frye should be
tested by examining whether unreliable scientific opinions will
now be barred. This discussion concludes that without assist-
ance from trial courts, Daubert cannot adequately protect a
defendant.
2. Pre-Daubert Problems with Forensic Proof
Because forensic proof is often the most devastating evi-
dence offered against criminal defendants, it would seem that
courts would stringently screen novel scientific evidence in crim-
inal cases. Nevertheless, forensic tests and techniques have in
the past made their way into the courtroom only to disappear
after being discredited. 58 Moreover, commentators have di-
rected scathing criticism at forensic identification "scientists"
who regularly testify.59
Pre-Daubert cases indicate that novel forensic evidence
could gain admission despite three somewhat different failings.
Each of these problems is briefly explored and then reanalyzed
in terms of how the issue should be approached post-Daubert.
a. Lack of Validation
Considerable forensic evidence made its way into the court-
room without empirical validation of the underlying theory and/
or its particular application. Courts never required some of the
most venerable branches of forensic science-such as finger-
printing, ballistics, and handwriting-to demonstrate their abil-
ity to make unique identifications. 60 Voiceprint evidence
57. See Gianelli, supra note 51, at 111 (noting that courts did not apply
Frye in a civil case until 1984).
58. See Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions,
137 MIL. L. Rlv. 167, 174-76 (1992) (discussing the paraffin test, voiceprints,
and hypnotically-refreshed evidence).
59. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regula-
tion, 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 109 (1991) (criticizing the poor quality that pervades
forensic science); Michael J. Saks, Implications of the Daubert Test for Forensic
Identification Science, 1 SEPAD's EXPERT & Sci. EvmD. Q. 427 (1994) ("[M]ost
of the forensic identification sciences cannot begin to meet the new Daubert
criterion by which they will be tested, although they easily passed the old Frye
standard. Identification science consists largely of speculation, impression, and
intuition. It is a field of assertedly scientific endeavor that, ironically, cannot
offer sufficient research data in its own behalf simply because its basic theoreti-
cal notions have been subjected to virtually no empirical testing.").
60. See Saks, supra note 59, at 429-33 (with the exception of DNA typing,
"forensic identification science has had the courthouse door thrown wide open
to it after virtually no scrutiny"). Id. at 433.
[Vol. 78:13451354
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gradually faded from the courtroom only after a blue-ribbon
panel, appointed by the National Academy of Sciences, con-
cluded that the scientific results reported to date did not provide
quantitative information that the accuracy of voice identifica-
tions improved when voice spectrograms are used.61 The "paraf-
fin" test has been discredited,6 2 and the ability of handwriting
examiners to reach accurate results has been questioned.6 3
Furthermore, even when scientists empirically validated a
forensic theory in a laboratory, they may not have verified the
particular courtroom application of the theory the profferer is
using. Thus, an expert may base her testimony on laboratory
applications in which the test was used to answer different ques-
tions than those before the court.64 For instance, just because a
test can match two samples of blood drawn in the laboratory
does not mean that the test is necessarily accurate if the blood is
degraded or contaminated with other substances.65 Often the
61. CONITTrEE ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMs, NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 10
(1979) (The technique "lacks a solid theoretical basis of answers to scientific
questions concerning the foundations of voice identification. This disparity be-
tween practice and theory appears to be recognized by practitioners and scien-
tists involved in the field of voice identification."). Despite the apparent
disappearance of voice prints from the forensic scene, it is interesting to note
that the Supreme Court cited two voiceprint cases, United States v. Smith, 869
F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979), with approval in Daubert, the first for
considering the known or potential rate of error, and the second for considering
the existence of professional standards. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993).
62. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1224-25 (1980).
63. See the forceful argument in D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting
Identification Expertise, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731 (1989). But see Moshe Kam et
al., Proficiency of Professional Document Examiners in Writer Identification, 39
J. FORENSIC SCI. 5, 7, 13 (1994) (conceding "a lamentable lack of empirical evi-
dence" but reporting that FBI examiners performed considerably better on a
test devised by the authors than college-educated nonexperts).
64. For example, a witness in 1988 may speak of DNA technology as hav-
ing been established in the 1960s even though no thought was given to forensic
applications until the 1980s. Possible limitations on finding matches, as when
the DNA was graded or contaminated, were not explored until lawyers, aca-
demics, and law reviews began asking specific questions.
65. See PAUL C. GiANxELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 1 SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE 564-67 (2d ed. 1993) (reviewing judicial treatment of electrophoretic
analysis of dried blood stains); see also Note, The Admissibility of Electropho-
retic Methods of Genetic Marker Bloodstain Typing Under Frye Standard, 11
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 773 (1986) (concluding that the proficiency of blood typ-
ing examiners is a legitimate concern).
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inability of a test to do what its proponents claim in a forensic
setting becomes evident only when lawyers start inquiring into
case specific conditions. Even though every person's DNA is
unique (except for identical twins), a particular technique for
comparing samples of DNA may be invalid.66
The language and reasoning of Daubert stress the need for
empirical verification of a technique's capacity to generate accu-
rate conclusions about a controverted issue.67 The emphasis on
testing, falsification, and validation suggests that a court should
require the prosecution to lay an adequate foundation about ex-
actly what the new test can do.68 Furthermore, a court must
make sure that the conclusions the technique generates "fit" the
specific facts of the particular case; otherwise there is no "valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry."69
b. Statistical Issues
Prior to Daubert, courts admitted scientific evidence with-
out noticing that, in some instances, the probative value of the
evidence depends on background statistical information. If, for
example, the samples of tape to which a defendant had access at
his place of work match samples of tape used to manufacture a
bomb sent through the mails from an unknown location, the pro-
bative value of that evidence is virtually non-existent if
thousands of identical rolls of tape were distributed throughout
the world.70 The crucial scientific inquiry in these cases is not
66. See Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of
Science, 77 JumcATUR 77, 79 (1993) (describing Maine sexual molestation case
in which prosecution's experts identified a match between DNA samples,
although bands had shifted, because they applied a percentage correction; de-
fense counsel were able to show that the correction technique had never been
validated).
67. The Court recognized that "a key question [is] ... whether a theory or
technique ... can be (and has been) tested." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. The
Court's retention of a "general acceptance" factor on its non-definitive list, see
supra text accompanying note 41, may mean that the courts will "grandfather
in" established forensic disciplines without requiring further empirical scru-
tiny. Yet, it should be noted that the Daubert Court specifically declined to
limit its analysis to novel scientific evidence, although it acknowledged that
"well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that
are novel...." Id. at 2796 n.11.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
69. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
70. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431,435-36 (6th Cir. 1970) (testify-
ing expert claiming that fragments of tape on bomb packing matched samples of
tape taken from defendant's place of work and both samples came from same
manufacturer and same batch), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971), vacated, 594
F. Supp. 1525, 1542-43 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (vacating conviction primarily because
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only whether the technique is capable of producing matches, but
also the probability that other matches exist.71
It is true of course that when a test can reliably match two
samples, such as samples of a defendant's blood, hair, drugs, or
bullets, with samples taken at the crime scene, the resulting evi-
dence passes the basic Rule 401 relevancy test. A match does
have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable..
. than it would be without the evidence." 72 We allow eyewit-
nesses to testify that the person fleeing the scene wore a yellow
jacket and permit proof that a defendant owned a yellow jacket
without establishing the background rate of yellow jackets in
the community. Jurors understand, however, that others than
the accused own yellow jackets. When experts testify about
samples matching in every respect, the jurors may be oblivious
to the probability concerns if no background rate is offered,73 or
may be unduly prejudiced or confused if the probability of a
match is confused with the probability of guilt,74 or if a back-
ground rate is offered that does not have an adequate scientific
foundation.75
of Fifth Amendment Brady violations but also because evidentiary hearing
demonstrated that sample from bomb packing did not differ from other samples
of tape that came from different batches); cf Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d 1024,
1029 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam) (allowing testimony about hair matching without
any discussion of mathematical probability), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982).
71. See, e.g., ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTFIc EVIDENCE IN CRIM-
NAL CASES 541 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that while courts have admitted neutron
activation analysis to match bullets and to link the accused to a crime involving
the use of a firearm, "the number of bullets manufactured with similar elemen-
tal characteristics by the same manufacturer may be so numerous as to make
the likelihood of the accused's link to the evidence bullet statistically tenuous.").
72. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides as follows: "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. Evm. 401.
73. See, for example, Stifel, 433 F.2d at 441 and Stifel, 594 F. Supp. at
1537.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1979)
(noting that prosecutor confused probability of match of hair with probability of
guilt).
75. In 1988, in Andrews v. State, the first case in which the prosecution
offered DNA evidence to prove guilt in a criminal trial, the expert testified that
the probability that the DNA in question came from someone else was 1 in
839,914,540. 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The defendant did
not call an expert. In contrast, in a 1990 evidentiary hearing, the FBI initially
stated the likelihood of a DNA match was 1 in 270,000 and then recalculated
the odds to be 1 in 35,000. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir.
1993), affg sub nom. United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991)
(rejecting the defenses position of a 1 in 49 probability). Regardless of what one
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The Daubert Court reminded judges that they have the
power to exclude prejudicial or confusing evidence pursuant to
Rule 403: "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite mis-
leading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this
risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative
force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control
over experts than over lay witnesses."7
6
c. Rates of Error and Proficiency Testing
Pre-Daubert courts often ignored laboratory and technician
error rates resulting from the subjectivity involved in interpret-
ing particular forensic tests and overlooked the lack of proper
laboratory procedures that can produce other kinds of errors.
77
Courts treated both of these sources of unreliability as going to
the "weight" of the evidence rather than as part of a founda-
tional inquiry.78
It is not yet clear what Daubert requires the profferer to
show as to the technicians' proficiency and the accuracy of their
procedures. 79 The Daubert Court noted rate of error as a perti-
nent aspect of the underlying methodological examination."0
The Court's mention of the existence of professional standards
in connection with this discussions ' provides some indication
thinks the appropriate probabilities are in cases of DNA evidence, the magni-
tude of the difference between Andrews and Yee is striking.
76. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound: It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D.
631, 632 (1991)); see generally Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (considering
the "accuracy, appropriateness, and possible dangers of utilizing mathematical
methods in the legal process").
77. See Jonakait, supra note 59, at 137-48 (discussing lack of empirical
base for and admissibility of forensic testing); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) (Chapter 4 addresses profi-
ciency concerns).
78. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foun-
dation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Er-
ror as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 21 & n.10 (1991).
79. The extent to which such rates can be developed for tests is also subject
to debate. For example, it is unclear whether the lack of data is due to the
unwillingness of forensic scientists to investigate error rates or because the na-
ture of many forensic tests preclude such an inquiry. See Randolph N.
Jonakait, Real Science and Forensic Science, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & SCI. EvID.
Q. 435, 443-48 (1994); John I. Thornton, Courts of Law v. Courts of Science: A
Forensic Scientist's Reaction to Daubert, 1 SHEPARs's EXPERT & SCI. EvM. Q.
475, 480-82 (1994).
80. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
81. See id.
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that the Court was concerned with how laboratory personnel
carried out the scientific test in question, and not merely with
ascertaining whether the test could provide results within a tol-
erable degree of error when the laboratory is working properly.
Because of Daubert's emphasis on evidentiary reliability, it is
certainly theoretically arguable that the profferer should bear a
threshold burden with regard to proficiency issues in criminal
cases. Putting the burden on the prosecutor is particularly ap-
propriate because an agency of the government that is prosecut-
ing the defendant probably developed, funded, and tested the
technique in que.stion. Whether in fact it is feasible to develop
proficiency testing has not yet been adequately explored.8 2
3. Realizing the Daubert Court's Reliability Objective Within
the Criminal System
Given the realities of the criminal justice system, trial
courts will find difficulty in effectuating the Daubert Court's
concern regarding the reliability of scientific evidence. If the
past is any guide, novel forensic evidence will continue to mate-
rialize in cases in which a defendant has court-appointed coun-
sel who may well know nothing about the new technique, not
even perhaps that it is a new technique,8 3 and does not have
funds to obtain the services of an expert.8 4 Studies show that
courts have been quite reluctant to authorize funds for defense
experts.85
Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the defense
will be able to adequately explore the problems with forensic evi-
dence discussed above even though the defendant is entitled to
considerable disclosure with respect to scientific evidence. Rule
16(a)(1)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
the defendant upon request to obtain "any results or reports...
of scientific tests or experiments" in the possession of the gov-
ernment "which are material to the preparation of the defense or
are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at
82. See Thornton, supra note 79, at 481 (pointing to the lack of any statis-
tics on error rates in operational crime laboratories).
83. See United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating
that "after the trial, defense counsel read in the newspaper that Bynum's con-
viction was the first obtained under the new federal/state 'Sniffer' program,"
involving gas chromatography of cocaine), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1105 (1994).
84. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 51, at 124-25; Peter J. Neufeld & Neville
Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 Sci. Am. 46, 53 (May
1990).
85. Giannelli, supra note 51, at 124-25.
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the trial."8 6 Courts have generally limited this provision to tests
performed in connection with the immediate proceedings.8 7 In
an unusual DNA decision, United States v. Yee, 88 a magistrate
judge allowed the defendants to obtain materials pertaining to
the validity of DNA testing, its statistical basis, and proficiency
tests by interpreting Rule 16(a)(1)(C) extremely broadly.8 9
Without expert assistance, however, the defense may not know
what to seek pursuant to these provisions or how to interpret
any information that it does receive.
As of December 1, 1993, which is post-Daubert, a defendant
may also request the following information from the
government:
At the defendant's request, the government shall disclose to the de-
fendant a written summary of testimony the government intends to
use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence dur-
ing its case in chief at trial. This summary must describe the wit-
nesses' opinions, the bases and the reasons therefor, and the witnesses'
qualifications.
9 0
Although the summary required by Rule 16 provides the defense
with some notice, the requirement of setting forth "the bases
and reasons for" the witnesses' opinions does not track the meth-
odological factors set forth by the Daubert Court. 91 In contrast
to the detailed information that Daubert deemed essential, the
disclosures in the summary are apt to be too conclusory to edu-
cate defense counsel or to provide them with effective ammuni-
tion for cross-examination. In the case of a novel technique, for
instance, scientifically unsophisticated attorneys often fail to ap-
preciate that the expert's conclusion rests on unestablished
probabilities, and thus, information about statistical issues is
unlikely to be forthcoming.92
86. FED. R. CRim. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
87. See United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978, 983-85 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977).
88. 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
89. Id. at 632-35. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) allows the defendant on request to ob-
tain "documents" in the government's possession "which are material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense." Id.
90. FED. R. Crum. P. 16(a)(1)(E) & (b)(1)(C)l. The rule "does not distinguish
between those cases where the expert will be presenting testimony on novel
scientific evidence." FED. R. CRnm. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
91. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
92. Cf United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1105 (1994). In Bynum, the prosecution sought to link the alleged
conspirators together by establishing that cocaine seized at different locations
all came from the same batch. Id. at 772. The court upheld the trial judge's
pre-Daubert admission of a cocaine analysis using gas chromatography, noting
that the government's "proffer of evidence could hardly have better anticipated
[Vol. 78:13451360
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Courts should adopt procedures that ensure the admission
of more reliable forensic evidence. Considering the time needed
to understand and investigate a new technique, courts should
require prosecutors to give notice of their intention to offer
"novel"93 forensic evidence as soon as this decision is reached.
Courts might also consider appointing experts pursuant to
Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence94 to advise the court
specifically about the methodological issues Daubert raises. The
expert would not be asked to opine about the ultimate conclu-
sions, such as whether the defendant's blood is a match for the
blood found on the victim, but only about issues that are rele-
vant to the judge's gatekeeping role.
With regard to the danger that an expert's opinion is based
on a technique incapable of producing accurate results, an ex-
pert who knows how to set up validating tests might be far more
helpful than an expert who has a stake in the technique in ques-
tion.95 The less related the expert is to the precise expertise giv-
ing rise to the new technique, the less likely the expert will have
preconceived notions.
A court-appointed expert will not be useful, however, unless
the expert understands the facts and issues that arise in the
Daubert." Id. at 773. The government explained the hypotheses underlying the
forensic technique, listed the numerous publications indicating that the tech-
nique had been subjected to peer review, and concluded with a citation to au-
thority that "gas chromatography enjoys general acceptance in the field of
forensic chemistry." Id. The prosecution did not mention the significance of
matches of samples nor did it offer evidence as to the extent to which the
batches of cocaine differed from each other.
93. "Novel" in this context should mean that the federal circuit in which
the district court is located has not yet rendered an opinion about the admissi-
bility of this type of evidence. By the time the issue reaches the appellate court,
therefore, it may have been explored by a number of district judges thereby
increasing the possibility that the validity of the test will have been explored in
a number of different factual contexts.
94. Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a) provides in part:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may ap-
point any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may ap-
point expert witnesses of its own selection.
FED. R. Evm. 706. Rule 706 and related statutes authorize payments to the
experts from public funds. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Ap-
pointed Experts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 706, 58-59 (Federal Judicial Center 1993).
95. See, e.g., MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 71, at 664 (noting that
whatever "general acceptance" existed with regard to voiceprints, "it was only
among those few workers who had staked a career on practicing 'voiceprint'
identification").
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particular case as opposed to the laboratory. When analyzing
blood samples, for example, the expert must consider whether
particular problems exist, such as degraded or contaminated
blood, whose impact has not yet been adequately tested.96 Law-
yers are probably more likely than scientists to see such case
specific issues. A court might also consider appointing a scien-
tifically sophisticated neutral lawyer 97 to articulate for the
methodological expert the issues that need to be addressed.98
It may prove more difficult to provide assistance to a court
so that it can avoid errors and prejudice due to misrepresenta-
tions or omissions about the statistical significance of the evi-
dence produced. Experience with DNA indicates that there may
be strong differences of opinion in the scientific community
about how to calculate probability estimates.99 When scientists
strongly disagree, the judge may have to limit the court-ap-
pointed expert's conclusions to explaining why and how experts
in the field differ. Consequently, the court will be in a better
position to make choices, such as placing limits on the probabili-
ties to which the expert may testify. 00 It may also be possible to
use verbal formulations to avoid prejudice when uncertainty
surrounds probability estimates.101
96. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
97. At the risk of touting my own field, I would suggest that law professors
might function effectively in such a capacity.
98. Cf. Margaret A. Berger, PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MECHANISMS
FOR DEALING WrrH EXPERTS IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION: A CRITIQUE AND PROPO-
SAL 53 (Carnegie Comm'n on Science, Technology & Gov't 1991) (suggesting
that special masters might formulate issues for Rule 706 experts in toxic tort
litigations).
99. See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 542, 564-65 (6th Cir. 1993);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 77 (Chapter 3 recommends "ceiling"
principle).
100. For a discussion of the controversy that arose with regard to the calcu-
lation of frequency estimates in connection with DNA evidence, see, for exam-
ple, United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1992); State v.
Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483 (N.H. 1992); State v. Anderson, 853 P.2d 135 (N.M.
Ct. App.), cert. granted, 848 P.2d 531 (N.M. 1993). For an explanation and anal-
ysis of the ceiling principle endorsed by the NRC report, see Richard Lempert,
DNA, Science and the Law: Two Cheers for the Ceiling Principle, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 41 (1993). See also B. Devlin et al., Comments on the Statistical
Aspects of the NRC's Report on DNA Typing, 39 J. FORENSIC SCI. 28, 34 (1994)
(concluding that "there is no scientific motivation for the NRC panel's ceiling
principle," but acknowledging that "the appropriate degree of conservatism is a
decision for legal scholars, not population geneticists or statisticians.").
101. See Kenneth R. Kreiling, DNA Technology in Forensic Science, 33
JURMETRICS J. 449, 479 n.132 (1993) (discussing Canadian cases in which ju-
ries are instructed that matches are "rare" or "extremely rare."); see also GIAN.
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Instead of appointing expert witnesses, a magistrate might
conduct hearings about the new technique and then render a re-
port.10 2 Issues bearing on laboratory procedures and proficiency
might be better explored in such a setting than by asking a
court-appointed expert to investigate the laboratory which per-
formed the forensic work.
B. CML CASES
1. Characteristics and Scope of Discussion
The procedural landscape in which issues arise as to the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence is obviously vastly different in
civil cases. The central imperative to protect a particular party
against inaccurate determinations is absent in the civil context.
Courts must consider efficiency and economy, as well as just re-
sults, in handling expert proof, because the effective resolution
of controversies is itself a central goal of our civil procedural
system.-0 3
In civil cases, disputes about scientific evidence almost in-
variably arise in the context of battling adverse experts. In
many sorts of civil litigation, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy their
burden of proof without scientific evidence. Consequently, un-
like criminal defendants who need not present a case, civil plain-
tiffs will always have some expert testimony available or they
would not be in court. The potential for adversarial exploration
of scientific evidence is thus more even-handed in civil than in
criminal cases.' 04 Furthermore, the new rules on expert discov-
ery provide civil litigants with tools to test their opponents' sci-
NELLI & IMWINEELRIED, supra note 65, at 578 (guidelines for verbal
formulations for evaluating paternity statistics).
102. See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (adopting a
magistrate's 120-page report and admitting evidence which resulted in a con-
viction), affd sub nom. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
103. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (these rules "shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."); Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 471-482 (West 1993)) (codifying expense and delay reduction plans); see also
supra text accompanying note 49 (quoting the Daubert Court regarding effi-
ciency and finality).
104. Of course, disparities in resources among civil litigants may mean that
the parties will not have equal access to experts. In the mass tort context dis-
cussed below, this problem may be less pressing than in other kinds of litiga-
tion, because the plaintiffs' bar now has adequate capital to handle these cases
effectively. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 480 (1994) (discussing impact of well-organized and
well-financed plaintiffs' bar).
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entific evidence prior to trial in an adversarial context, as
depositions of experts are now available as of right. 105
The following discussion demonstrates the impact these
characteristics have on the resolution of issues surrounding the
presentation of scientific evidence. The discussion considers
these questions in the context of toxic tort litigation, both be-
cause Daubert itself belongs in this category and because a con-
siderable number of opinions already exist that illuminate
problems that will arise.
The first section considers how Daubert's twin objectives-
liberality in admitting expert proof and the exclusion of unrelia-
ble scientific evidence-intersect with the new discovery
rules10 6 to affect the in limine screening of expert scientific testi-
mony. The discussion concentrates on objections a defendant
can make to a plaintiffs expert evidence because that is the
usual context in which challenges to the admissibility of expert
scientific evidence arise. The second section considers a number
of other issues that a court will face in exercising its gatekeeping
obligation such as the nature of in limine hearings and the im-
pact of Daubert on summary judgment motions. The final sec-
tion considers the problems raised by multi-party toxic tort
litigation and the potential of various procedural devices to re-
duce the need to re-examine scientific evidence in numerous sep-
arate actions.
105. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) provides as follows: "A
party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opin-
ions may be presented at trial. If a report from the expert is required under
subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition shall not be conducted until after the report
is provided." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
106. Throughout the following discussion, the author assumes that the De-
cember 1, 1993 amendments to the discovery rules are in effect. Primarily per-
tinent to the discussion below are the provisions for mandatory expert
disclosure in Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and the provisions for planning future discovery
in Rule 26(f), both of which are discussed below. See infra notes 131-135, 155-
156 and accompanying text. Neither of these rules changes were hotly opposed
in Congress, and they were not included in the bill passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives that sought to keep some provisions from taking effect. Carl To-
bias, Let Sleeping Legislation Lie, CoNN. L. TRm., Feb. 7, 1994, at 24. Although
some districts have opted-out of these provisions, they have primarily opted-out
of the initial mandatory disclosure procedure specified in Rule 26(a)(1) that has
no bearing on this Article. As of the date of this writing, the situation is so fluid
and confused that it seems pointless to provide details about the various dis-
tricts' actions. Indeed, a memorandum prepared by the Federal Judicial Center
dated March 3, 1994 contains the most current and detailed information avail-
able. This memorandum summarizes the action taken by the district courts,
but the FJC specifically requests that the document not be cited as legal
authority.
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2. Triggering Judicial Screening
a. Defendant's Burden
The Daubert Court did not enumerate the circumstances
that will trigger judicial screening pursuant to Rule 104(a). In a
civil case, however, the evidentiary policies underlying
Daubert's competing rationales, efficiency and fairness concerns,
and the structure of the discovery rules, all dictate placing a
burden on the opponent of the evidence to make a prima facie
showing that the proponent's evidence suffers from the deficien-
cies identified in Daubert, before the court has any obligation to
undertake an admissibility determination.10 7
Allocating the initial burden to the opponent of the evidence
furthers the Daubert Court's gatekeeping objective without
hampering the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules-vis a vis
expert testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence mandate a
somewhat similar approach for evidence that satisfies the busi-
ness record or public record hearsay exceptions. The evidence is
admissible "unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness." 08 This formulation
accommodates the preference for liberally admitting such evi-
dence and the concern that such evidence may at times be unre-
liable. Consequently, the evidence is made presumptively
admissible. The Court's analysis in Daubert suggests that scien-
tific expert testimony requires the same treatment-the evi-
dence should be presumed to be admissible until the opponent
discharges its burden to show the contrary. There is one impor-
tant difference. Unlike the hearsay exceptions which place the
burden of persuasion on the opponent of the evidence with re-
gard to lack of trustworthiness, Rule 104(a) requires the burden
of persuasion to remain with the profferor.10 9 Accordingly, the
defendant only has to shoulder the burden of coming forward
with evidence showing that the plaintiffs expert proof is inad-
missible. Plaintiff bears the burden of showing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the expert's opinion is admissible.
107. See infra part II.B.4. (discussing analogous treatment of defendant's
initial burden of production on summary judgment motions turning on the ad-
missibility or sufficiency of scientific evidence).
108. FED. R. EvD. 803(8); see FD. R. EVID. 803(6).
109. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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Placing the burden of production on the defendant also fur-
thers the prime evidentiary objective of accurate fact-finding °
which in the civil context is not skewed by the need to protect
the accused. The core insight of Daubert is the recognition that
expert scientific evidence cannot assist the trier of fact unless it
reflects valid scientific thinking. By rejecting Frye's "general ac-
ceptance" standard, the Court has spurned reliance on pat for-
mulae. Instead, the majority's analysis acknowledges that
determining validity will require judicial consideration of nu-
merous complex factors. In order for a court to perform this
task, it needs information. Imposing a burden on the defendant
increases the likelihood that the court will have access to de-
tailed methodological data that has been explored in an adver-
sarial context at discovery. The new discovery rules on expert
testimony facilitate inquiries mandated by Daubert because
they too seek to ensure the disclosure of data underlying an ex-
pert's conclusions."1
Daubert's endorsement of judicial screening pursuant to
Rule 104(a) presupposes pretrial termination of some litigations
in which scientific expert testimony is crucial. Courts have
heretofore read evidentiary and procedural rules together in the
context of expert testimony so as to further the goal of more ef-
fective adjudication at the pre-trial stage. Even before Rule
705-which allows experts to state their conclusions before re-
vealing their bases-was amended to restrict its applicability to
the trial context- 12 -courts refused to allow parties to submit
conclusory expert affidavits on summary judgment motions.
Courts excluded such affidavits as useless in determining
whether summary judgment was proper, though the experts'
statements mirrored the direct testimony allowed by Rule 705,
and Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
110. Federal Rule of Evidence 102 provides: "These rules shall be construed
... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined." FED. R. EvID. 102.
111. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
112. In 1993, Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended be-
cause amendments to Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly require disclosure in advance of trial of the basis and reasons for an
expert's opinions. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16 & 26. The original Rule 705 and its
amended version read as follows:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give rea-
sons therefore without prier Eliseurz zf first testifying to the under-
lying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert
may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data
on cross-examination.
See FED. R. EvID. 705; Fed. R. Evid. 705 (1987).
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that affidavits "shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence."" 3 The courts' reconciliation of Rule 705 and Rule
56(e) had the same objective that is here proposed-to improve
the judge's ability to determine how the case should proceed.
Finally, judicial economy is served by placing an initial bur-
den on defendant. To require courts to undertake judicial
screening whenever scientific evidence is offered would need-
lessly overwhelm the courts. In order for a judge to determine
whether an examination into methodology is justified, the bur-
den must be higher than merely allowing the defendant to point
to a battle of the experts and claim that the other side's expert is
relying on invalid science. 114
b. Suggested Approach
The approach proposed in this Article can be illustrated by
examining a pre-Daubert toxic tort action, In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litigation,"5 and analyzing how a court might handle the
expert proof issues after Daubert. In Paoli, thirty-eight plain-
tiffs, who worked at, or lived adjacent to the defendants' railroad
yard, claimed injuries caused by exposure to PCBs.116 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the defendants after
excluding the plaintiffs' expert evidence." 7 . The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed in an extensive opinion by Judge
Becker, faulting the trial court for failing to give the plaintiffs
113. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(e); see, e.g., Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d
1482, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that conclusory affidavit by expert will
not suffice to avert summary judgment when discovery is almost complete).
114. Although judges express unhappiness about undue partisanship on the
part of expert witnesses, see Cecil & Willging, supra note 94, at 13 n.23, dis-
agreements by experts about the interpretation of data do not mean that one of
the experts is relying on an invalid methodology. Much of science is subjective.
A recent survey by the Federal Judicial Center concluded that orthopedists
(17.8%) and neurologists (15.6%) are the two most prevalent types of experts
testifying in civil cases. See J. CECIL & MOLLY JOHNSON, PROBLEMS OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN CivL TRIALS: PRELmINARY FINDINGS (Federal Judicial Center
1994) (forthcoming). Daubert is unlikely to have any effect in most cases in
which these two types of experts testify.
115. 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990),
and cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
116. Id. at 361.
117. Id. at 376.
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sufficient opportunity to develop an adequate record" 8 and for
not heeding the Circuit's test for applying Rule 702.1 9
On remand, before Daubert and before the 1993 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court,
after five days of in limine hearings, again excluded much of the
plaintiffs' expert evidence' 20 and granted summary judg-
ment.121 That determination is now on appeal. The following
discussion does not address the merits of the district court's de-
cisions; it only discusses how post-Daubert courts should handle
the admissibility of testimony similar to that of the plaintiffs'
expert witness, Dr. Nisbet, the subject of one of the in limine
motions before the district court.122
After the Third Circuit Court of Appeals remanded Paoli,
the defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, re-
quested the trial court to again exclude the testimony of Dr. Nis-
bet, the plaintiffs' expert in assessing the plaintiffs' exposure to
PCBs. 123 In March 1992, Dr. Nisbet had provided a report that
concluded the plaintiffs "were sufficiently exposed [to PCBs from
the Paoli rail yard] ... to lead to the expectation that they would
suffer adverse health effects."' 24 At a deposition in 1992, he had
also testified in some detail about his theory of calculating the
plaintiffs' exposure to PCBs. 125 The defendants' motion in
limine to exclude Dr. Nisbet's testimony was accompanied by an
affidavit from a Dr. Whysner, who then testified for the defense
at the two day in limine hearing at which Dr. Nisbet also testi-
118. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 854 n.30. The case management order granted the
plaintiffs three months for discovery limited to the nature and extent of PCBs
at the railroad yard and health effects on the defendants' employees. Id. It also
permitted the defendants discovery with regard to the plaintiffs' prima facie
case of causation but did not permit the plaintiffs any discovery with regard to
the defendants' experts. Id.
119. Id. at 836. Judge Becker concluded that the district court had not prop-
erly applied the circuit's Downing test which stresses that a Rule 702 inquiry
should focus on the validity of an expert's methodology. Id. at 856-57 (citing
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.1985)). The Daubert Court
also cited Downing with approval and stated that it is a decision "on which our
discussion draws in part." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 n.12.
120. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 1992 WL 321226, 1992 WL
323512, 1992 WL 323525, 1992 WL 323531, 1992 WL 323536, 1992 WL 323559,
1992 WL 323564, 1992 WL 323589, 1992 WL 323633, 1992 WL 323675, 1992
WL 323493 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (reviewing in limine motions to exclude expert
testimony).
121. 1992 WL 315216 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
122. 1992 WL 321226 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *5.
125. Id. at *4.
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fled.126 The court excluded Dr. Nisbet from testifying, 127 as well
as other experts proffered by the plaintiffs, and granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants. 128
The district court's opinion on the motion in limine does not
identify the details of Dr. Nisbet's report. Now, however, ex-
perts who may testify at trial must furnish reports that include
specified items. A few months after the Daubert opinion, Rule
26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to
require a party, independently of any discovery request, to dis-
close the identity of all expert witnesses expected to testify at
trial, to provide the experts' written signed reports, and to make
the expert available for deposition after the report is submit-
ted.129 In the absence of court order or stipulation, a party must
disclose these items at least ninety days before the trial date or
the date on which the case is to be ready for trial.130
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires the reports to set forth "a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and rea-
126. The defendants raised two major problems with Dr. Nisbet's methodol-
ogy. First, he multiplied 1987 laboratory results regarding the plaintiffs' PCB
blood levels by a factor of two and one-half to three, because he decided that the
results were unreliable. Id. at *6. He reached this conclusion because the labo-
ratory had reported results on other persons in 1986 that were lower than those
reported by another laboratory on the same samples, which had been split and
sent to different laboratories for testing. Id. at *5. According to the defendants'
expert, standard techniques existed, which Dr. Nisbet never used, to check reli-
ability when split sample results differ, such as requesting quality control data
from the laboratories in question or seeking inter-laboratory verification data
from the EPA's proficiency testing program. Id. at *6-8. Further, Dr. Nisbet
used a method of back-calculation to arrive at conclusions about the plaintiffs'
exposure to PCBs that rested on assumptions which the defendants' expert tes-
tified had no support in the scientific literature and studies. Id. at *11. The
district court noted that Dr. Nisbet's back-calculation method had been previ-
ously found unreliable in Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc., 1990 WL 312969
(W.D.N.C. 1990). Id. at *19.
127. Id. at *20.
128. 1992 WL 315216.
129. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(2); see supra note 106 (regarding district courts
opting-out of this provision).
130. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(C). The Advisory Committee's note further ex-
plains that the information should be disclosed in the following manner:
[S]ufficiently in advance of trial [such] that opposing parties have a
reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross examination and
perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses. Normally
the court should prescribe a time for these disclosures in a scheduling
order under Rule 16(b), and in most cases the party with the burden of
proof on an issue should disclose its expert testimony on that issue
before other parties are required to make their disclosures with respect
to that issue.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee's note.
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sons therefor" as well as the "data or other information consid-
ered by the witness in forming the opinions."131 These
provisions probably do not contemplate underlying methodologi-
cal details such as those which appear on the Daubert Court's
non-definitive checklist of factors; the mandatory disclosure rule
was drafted long before the Supreme Court issued the Daubert
opinion.' 3 2 Yet, the experts' reports do provide a starting point
for further inquiry, and Daubert informs parties of the issues
that warrant further exploration during the deposition of the ex-
pert, as now authorized by Rule 26(b)(4)(A).
Assuming that the Paoli remand had occurred after
Daubert and the Rules amendments, what would be the parties'
obligations regarding expert scientific evidence? First, the
plaintiffs would have to furnish Dr. Nisbet's report. It would
have to reveal how he reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs'
exposure to PCBs was sufficient to cause anticipated future ad-
verse health effects. 133 As yet we have no judicial guidance
about how much detail an expert must provide relating to "ba-
sis," "reasons," "data," or "information."134 The text of Rule
26(a)(2), however, does not seem to require divulgence of error
rates or whether an expert's methodology is currently used by
others, two of the factors noted by the Daubert Court.'3 5 We
also do not know how much information must be furnished
about the methodology used.
If the defendant now moves to exclude Dr. Nisbet's testi-
mony and supports its motion with an affidavit by Dr. Whysner
alleging that Dr. Nisbet's methodology is flawed, must a court,
131. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
132. We do not yet know if courts will look to Daubert in interpreting Rule
26(a)(2). See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the similar re-
quirement that has been added to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
133. See supra text accompanying note 34.
134. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Compare the previous provision in Rule
26(b)(4), now deleted, that permitted parties to obtain the following information
through interrogatories: "the subject matter on which the expert is expected to
testify, and ... the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i), U.S.C.S. RULES OF CVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 26 (1982). The Ad-
visory Committee's note to Rule 26(a)(2) explains as follows: "The information
disclosed under the former rule in answering interrogatories about the 'sub-
stance' of expert testimony was frequently so sketchy and vague that it rarely
dispensed with the need to depose the expert and often was even of little help in
preparing for a deposition of the witness." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2) advisory
committee's note.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 131-132. Both of these factors were
implicated in the defendants' attack on Dr. Nisbet at the Paoli in limine hear-
ing. See supra note 126.
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without more, entertain the motion in limine? If the defendant
has a substantial initial burden of production, as this Article ad-
vocates, 136 then under these circumstances it did not ,satisfy its
burden. Unless flaws in methodology are self-evident on the
face of the plaintiffs expert's report, the defendant should obtain
the information needed for a Rule 702 challenge without judicial
assistance by deposing the expert. The amendments to the
Rules are designed to provide litigants with enough information
through the reports so that a subsequent deposition can focus
economically and efficiently on points that need elaboration.
The parties should specify the specific methodological details
about which their experts disagree before the court is required
to expend time on the motion.
The defendant may at times be able to satisfy its initial bur-
den of production through statements made by the plaintiffs ex-
pert at a deposition, either by wringing a concession from the
expert 137 or by developing concrete details about flaws in the ex-
pert's methodology.138 Otherwise, the defendant will have to
put forward its own experts to justify a Rule 104(a) inquiry. 139
136. See supra text accompanying note 114 (addressing Daubert's impact on
the defendant's burden in a 104(a) motion).
137. See, e.g., Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614-15 (7th Cir.
1993). After the district court granted summary judgment on the basis of Frye,
the Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings under Daubert and af-
firmed the grant of summary judgment, because "the district court's approach
anticipated Daubert's directive." Id. at 614. The plaintiff claimed that the de-
fendant's product caused plaintiffs kidney disease. Id. at 609. The district
court rejected the plaintiffs three experts on causation. One expert failed to
implicate the defendant's product as the cause for the plaintiffs disease. Id. at
614. The second admitted offering a "kind of a curb side opinion." Id. at 615.
She admitted on deposition that "[i]f. .. you were asking me to give you an
analytical, scientific opinion, then, I would have to research it, and I have
neither the time nor the inclination to do that." Id. The plaintiffs third expert
agreed that his opinion was a "hypothesis, the proof of which remains to be
made." Id.
138. See, e.g., Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341,
345-46 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (excluding plaintiffs expert testimony regarding the
link between topical use of a Vitamin A derivative and birth defects because it
did not meet Daubert; the expert could not testify as to how much Vitamin A
could be absorbed through the skin and had not compared the dosages of Vita-
min A in prior studies with the dosages in defendant's product); cf. DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D.N.J. 1992), (excluding
expert testimony that failed to conform to any known methodology) affd mem.,
6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
139. See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware, Co., 998
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993). The court held that the
trial judge had erred in granting summary judgment by concluding that the
plaintiffs expert economic evidence was inadmissible. Id. at 1241. The court
found that the economists' method was reliable and that the defendants had not
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In our Paoli hypothetical, this means that the defendant must
produce its own expert during discovery if Dr. Nisbet did not
concede errors in his methodology. 140
The defendant should not be permitted to satisfy this bur-
den of production by affidavits from experts who were not part of
the discovery process In terms of fairness, both sides should be
entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to challenge sci-
entific expert opinions in an adversarial context. In our hypo-
thetical, the plaintiff has not had an adequate opportunity to
challenge Dr. Whysner. Courts should extend Rule 26(a)(2)'s re-
quirement of mandatory expert disclosure to all experts utilized
in bringing an in limine motion-even those who are not techni-
cally subject to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) because they are not listed as
trial witnesses. 141 Courts should not permit the defendant to
obtain a hearing on a motion in limine by relying on affidavits
from experts unless their identity and reports have been sup-
plied to the plaintiff in the course of discovery and the plaintiff
had an opportunity to depose. Moreover, courts should not allow
established the contrary. Id. at 1238. The defendants' attempt "to poke holes"
in the economists' study during the experts' depositions did not suffice to estab-
lish the study's invalidity. Id. The court cited Daubert, id. at 1241, and specifi-
cally mentioned that no defense experts had testified that the study's method
was methodologically flawed, id. at 1238. It therefore concluded that the de-
fendants had "established no valid basis for challenging the study's reliability."
Id. at 1241.
140. In Paoli, the defendant did depose the expert; although it may have
elicited details about Dr. Nisbet's methodology during that deposition, it seems
unlikely that Dr. Nisbet conceded flaws in his methodology at that time because
the opinion makes no mention of this fact. His failure to verify data by stan-
dard methods seems to have been developed through Dr. Whysner's testimony
at the motion in limine. See supra note 126.
141. A court undoubtedly has power pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 16 to require parties to provide each other with expert reports and an
opportunity for the deposition of experts retained in connection with in limine
motions. Revisions to Rule 16 in 1993 emphasize the power of trial judges via
"limitations or restrictions on the use of testimony under Rule 702 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence," FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(4), "the control and scheduling of
discovery," FED. R. CIrv. P. 16(c)(6), and facilitating "the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive disposition of the action," FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(16). The court can in-
form the parties that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provisions will apply to experts retained
for in limine motions, either when considering their proposed discovery plan
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) or at a later Rule 16
conference.
If the expert whom the defendant wishes to use in connection with a motion
in limine was expected to testify at trial and disclosure was not forthcoming,
the witness could not be used in connection with the motion. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(c) was amended in 1993 to provide that a party may not "use
as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information
not so disclosed." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
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the defendant to rely on affidavits from expert witnesses whose
identity and reports were disclosed, but who now wish to raise
new issues about which the plaintiff never had notice.
Effectuating the goals of Daubert requires the defendant to
meet a higher burden of production than merely alleging infir-
mities in the plaintiff's expert proof. The Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that a liberal admissibility policy is embedded in
the Federal Rules of Evidence, but also confirmed the judge's
role in keeping unreliable evidence out of the courtroom.142
Treating the plaintiffs expert testimony as presumptively ad-
missible until the defendant comes forward with concrete exam-
ples of unreliability accommodates both rationales. The court's
need for information that may lead to a final adjudication would
be frustrated if a defendant may simply allege that the plain-
tiffs scientific evidence is unreliable instead of providing assist-
ance to the court. Further, requiring a defendant to show
specific defects developed through discovery means that courts
need not expend limited resources in manning the gates except
in instances when there is good reason to fear that unreliable
evidence might otherwise enter.
3. The Rule 104(a) In Limine Proceeding
As mentioned above, once the court undertakes a Rule
104(a) inquiry, the plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that their expert's opinion is ad-
missible. 143 The answers to other issues that may arise in con-
nection with judicial screening are considerably less clear-cut.
a. Procedural Issues
If a court entertains a 104(a) motion, it must choose an ap-
propriate procedure for resolving the particular controversy. 44
Whether a court proceeds on submitted papers, oral arguments,
or evidentiary hearings will depend on the nature of the method-
ological issues and the responses of the parties' experts. The
court may not need to hear testimony from the experts if the
142. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
143. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.10 (citing Bouxjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987)).
144. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e) provides the following: "When a
motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter
on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." FED. R.
Civ. P. 43(e).
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methodological issues have been adequately explored at
depositions.
Because of the changes in Rule 26 and the Daubert decision,
when a court orders evidentiary hearings, they will probably be
considerably shorter than the five day in limine hearings in the
Paoli case. The court will no longer need to detail the plaintiffs'
expert's methodology or the defense expert's contentions about
its defects, because the parties will have elicited this informa-
tion before the defendant sought judicial screening.145 Instead,
the court should concentrate on determining whether the plain-
tiffs can justify the methodology their expert used by reference
to factors discussed in Daubert.46 The court may also seek
assistance from an expert appointed pursuant to Rule 706,147 or
authorize a magistrate judge to report after conducting a hear-
ing so as to develop an adequate record.' 48
b. Types of Evidence Courts Should Consider During a Rule
104(a) Inquiry
No evidentiary rules other than those of privilege apply at a
hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a),149 and Rule 43(e) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge to proceed on
affidavits, depositions, or oral testimony. 50 Although the dis-
145. The court might wish the parties to furnish a brief statement summa-
rizing the facts that are in dispute about the expert's methodology. Such a
statement would be akin to statements some local court rules require to be filed
with a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. LR 3(g)
(providing that the moving party must annex "a separate, short and concise
statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is
no genuine issue to be tried;" the opposing party must issue a similar statement
setting forth the material facts as to which it claims there is a dispute).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
147. See supra note 94 (setting forth text of Rule 706); Renaud v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1548, 1553 (D. Colo. 1990) (relying on testi-
mony of court-appointed geologist to grant summary judgment motion for de-
fendants; court-appointed expert advised that plaintiffs' exposure over an 11-
year period to hazardous wastes could not be extrapolated from one water sam-
ple), affd, 972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 94-102 and accom-
panying text (discussing court-appointed experts in criminal cases). See
generally Cecil & Willging, supra note 94, at 12-13 (noting that interviews with
federal judges indicated some willingness to use court-appointed experts on is-
sues of technical expertise).
148. Cf United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1993) (discuss-
ing six-week DNA hearing held by magistrate judge resulting in 120-page re-
port and recommendation that was adopted by the district court in the case
below, United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991)).
149. For text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 104(a), see supra note 28.
150. For text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e), see supra note 144.
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trict court has enormous discretion on how to proceed, oral testi-
mony and depositions should clearly be preferred. Courts
should not permit parties to submit evidence from undisclosed
experts or to raise new issues for the same reasons it should not
allow the defendants to rely on this evidence in obtaining a Rule
104(a) inquiry. Courts cannot attain the Supreme Court's objec-
tives in Daubert-to honor the "liberal thrust" of the Federal
Rules towards expert opinion while simultaneously demanding
reliability-if they base decisions to exclude experts on allega-
tions not yet tested through the adversarial process. 151
Consequently, a court should generally restrict its review to
materials developed during discovery when it rules on a Rule
104(a) motion, unless it wishes to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Affidavits are too often conclusory, unfocused, and vague.' 52
Moreover, parties should not expect the scientifically untrained,
generalist judge to deal with chapters of scientific books and ar-
ticles attached to motion papers. In connection with such mater-
ials, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern in Daubert is particularly
apt; he expressed fears about the "obligation or authority" of
trial judges "to become amateur scientists" to fulfill their
gatekeeping role.153 At a trial, the Federal Rules of Evidence
ensure that such scientific data is subject to adversarial
scrutiny.154
c. Procedure upon Exclusion of Expert Evidence
To maintain the efficiency of judicial screening, courts
should generally refuse to grant the plaintiff additional opportu-
nity to obtain new expert evidence if the court excludes their
original expert. 15 5 Allowing the plaintiff to look for another ex-
151. Cf. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1122 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (Reavley, J., dissenting) (objecting to exclusion of plaintiffs ex-
pert testimony where exclusion was based on affidavits of defendant's experts
who were never deposed), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
152. Cf supra note 9 and accompanying text (regarding conclusory nature of
Dr. Lamm's affidavit).
153. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2800
(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ,
154. See FED. R. EvIm. 803(18) (allowing learned treatises to be read at trial
but only in connection with expert testimony: the statements have to be "called
to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or [be] relied upon
by the expert witness in direct examination"). Experts may rely on hearsay
evidence as a basis for their opinions, see FED. R. EvIn. 703, on cross-examina-
tion, however, the expert may be required to reveal the basis underlying the
opinion, see FED. R. Evm. 705.
155. Cf Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975) (refus-
ing to permit testimony by expert retained by plaintiffs after trial began when
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pert, who would then be subject to discovery, would obviously
cause delay, expense, and the additional outlay of judicial time.
If the defendant must meet a burden of production in connection
with a Rule 104(a) inquiry as the foregoing discussion suggests,
the plaintiff will have had notice of the defendant's objections to
the plaintiffs experts, an opportunity to challenge the defense's
experts, and some time in which to secure additional
assistance.1 56
4. The Motion for Summary Judgment
As the Paoli case demonstrates, when the defendant suc-
ceeds in excluding the plaintiffs' experts on a crucial element of
the plaintiffs' case, summary judgment follows as a matter of
course. In addition, as the Daubert Court acknowledges,357 the
plaintiffs' scientific evidence testimony, although admissible,
may be insufficient to sustain a verdict. If the standard of proof
applied to a defendant's initial burden of production in moving
for summary judgment is lower than that imposed in connection
with motions in limine, the defendant will seek to move for sum-
mary judgment without first moving in limine. Furthermore, if
the defendant can force the plaintiffs to put in their scientific
evidence without the defendant having to supply affirmative
proof, the defendant will have no incentive to conduct discovery.
The defendant will instead seek to bring a summary judgment
motion as soon as possible. This section first considers the pres-
ent unsettled law relating to the moving party's burden on a
plaintiffs should have known that testimony by other expert retained prior to
trial was insufficient as to causation).
156. The plaintiffs may, of course, have considerable difficulty in obtaining
scientific data supporting their position when a particular type of toxic tort
claim is first put forth. A study of the Bendectin litigation suggests that scien-
tific studies may be undertaken in response to litigation. See Sanders, supra
note 7, at 321-48. Whether courts should respond by requiring a lesser showing
from plaintiffs in early cases is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf Richardson
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Richardson
court explained its earlier decision in Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) thus:
Ferebee stands for the proposition that courts should be very reluctant
to alter a jury's verdict when the causation issue is novel and "stand[s]
at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry." If ex-
perts are willing to testify to causation in such situations and their
methodology is sound, the jury's verdict should not be disturbed.
857 F.2d at 832 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534) (footnote omitted). Proce-
dural devices such as class actions and consolidation may also have the effect of
lessening the plaintiffs burden. See infra part II.B.5.b. (discussing aggregated
actions).
157. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Rule 56 motion. It then suggests that the defendant should
have a substantial initial burden of production on all summary
judgment motions. Relieving the defendant of the incentive to
conduct discovery deprives the court of an adequate record on
which to make a decision and poses too great a risk for plaintiff
harassment.
Current law is far from clear on the precise nature of the
standard of proof that applies to the defendant's initial burden
of production in moving for summary judgment. 158 Although
the Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1986 in Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett,159 the ensuing three opinions did little to abate the
confusion. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, which was joined
by three other justices, commanded a majority only because Jus-
tice White concurred in the result. Justice White, however,
wrote separately and disagreed sharply with the Chief Justice
on the nature of the defendant's initial burden, as did Justice
Brennan, who dissented.
In Celotex, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to a previous
opinion by the Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 160 and ex-
plained that language in that case should not be
construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary
judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving
party bears the burden of proof. Instead, as we have explained, the
burden on the moving party may be discharged by "showing"-that is,
pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party's case.
16 1
Justice White, who cast the deciding vote in Celotex, took a very
different view: "It is not enough to move for summary judgment
without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory
assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case....
It is the defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis
158. See Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Bur-
dens, 10 Ais. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 413, 462 (1987) ("Remarkably, after almost fifty
years of experience with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is still difficult
to summarize burdens of production and persuasion under Rule 56.").
159. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
160. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
161. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. In Celotex, the defendant moved for summary
judgment, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence of expo-
sure to a Celotex product. Id. at 319-20. The Court remanded for the lower
court to determine whether documents the plaintiff had produced in response to
the motion would defeat summary judgment; no issue was raised relating to the
admissibility of expert testimony. Id. at 326-28.
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for the suit."162 Whatever the merits of the plurality approach
in the ordinary case, when the crucial issues revolve around sci-
entific evidence, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to "put up or
shut up" should not generally suffice.163 The nature of the
court's task is of a very different order when it must evaluate
scientific expert opinions than when it searches the record in a
case like Celotex to determine whether the plaintiff has identi-
fied evidence relevant to specific facts essential to its case. In
the latter case, the court must consider whether the plaintiff has
pointed to witnesses or documents that it believed would prove
its position.-6 4
When the defendant alleges inadequacies in the plaintiffs
scientific expert proof, the court has a very different assignment.
If the defendant asserts that the opinion never passed the
threshold of admissibility, the court must engage in the complex
analysis of methodology mandated by Daubert.165 If the defend-
ant contends instead that the studies on which the plaintiff re-
lies are "insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that
the [plaintiffs] position more likely than not is true," 66 the
court must evaluate the conclusions reached in the studies. In
162. Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring). In his dissent, Justice Brennan pre-
dicted that the majority's failure to clearly explain its reasoning would "very
likely create confusion" in the district courts. Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Commentators have agreed with his assessment. See Mullenix, supra
note 158, at 456. Justice Brennan agreed with Justice White, concluding that,
"[p]lainly, a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is
insufficient. Such a 'burden' of production is no burden at all and would simply
permit summary judgment procedure to be converted into a tool for harass-
ment." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Brennan also suggested that the moving party may have an affirmative
duty "to depose the nonmoving party's witnesses .... " Id.
163. Shifting the burden to the plaintiff may be justified, however, when the
plaintiffs' own experts on discovery concede the absence of a valid scientific the-
ory in support of their position. See, e.g., Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d
607, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1993). Under such circumstances, however, the defendant
is able to make more than a bare assertion.
164. In Celotex, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to iden-
tify witnesses who could testify to the asbestos exposure, and, in response, the
plaintiff produced letters from two individuals. 477 U.S. at 319-21. The
Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs evidence was sufficient to sustain her burden. Id.
at 327-28.
165. The Court proposes in Daubert that the admissibility of scientific ex-
pert proof pursuant to Rule 702 hinges on the methodology and not the conclu-
sions of the expert. See supra notes 30-40. The Court mentions, but does not
discuss, other rules that may bear on admissibility. See supra text accompany-
ing note 46.
166. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798
(1993).
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either event, the court may have to resolve numerous complex
questions relating to methodology and the likelihood that the
plaintiffs experts' opinions are more likely than not true. If the
defendant denies that its product caused the plaintiffs injuries,
the court may, for instance, have to decide which methodologies
are valid for proving causation,1 67 whether the methodology em-
ployed was too skewed to be valid,168 how to resolve issues of
conflicting methodologies, 169 how to handle statistical signifi-
cance,170 and how to reconcile the preponderance of proof stan-
dard with the risks found in an epidemiological study. 17 '
Unless the defects in the plaintiffs expert proof are appar-
ent on the face of the plaintiffs submission,172 the court cannot
167. Is testimony by a physician relying on the methodology of clinical
medicine admissible to prove causation? See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir.) (permitting physician to testify to causal
relationship based solely on diagnostic methodology and refusing to require
animal or epidemiological studies as a prerequisite to admissibility of testi-
mony), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Ad-
missibility of Expert Testimony in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.: The
Neglected Issue of the Validity of Nonscientific Reasoning by Scientific Wit-
nesses, 70 DENVER U. L. REV. 473, 485-93 (1993) (suggesting that Rule 702 per-
mits analogical reasoning).
168. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp.
1042, 1047-59 (D.N.J. 1992), affd mem., 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
169. Compare Burrell v. Septa (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.) No. 86-
2229, 1992 WL 323633, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (excluding evidence of animal
studies on a motion in limine on the ground that using animal studies in the
face of contradictory epidemiological data is an unreliable use of data) with Vil-
lari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568, 571 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (refusing
to exclude animal studies on motion in limine, but noting that court was not
deciding sufficiency issue).
170. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941,
946-49 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing issues arising from use of statistical signifi-
cance concepts); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312
(5th Cir.) (discussing statistical significance and confidence intervals), modi-
fled, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); see Brief
Amici Curiae of Professors Rothman et al., in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., reprinted in 1 SHEPARD's EXPERT & Sm. EvD. Q. 75, 78-
82 (1993) (discussing the importance of statistical significance).
171. Compare Maiorana v. National Gypsum Co. (In re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig.), 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1037-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting judg-
ment as a matter of law on the ground that epidemiological studies failed to
demonstrate a sufficiently strong and consistent association between asbestos
exposure and colon cancer) with Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671,
675-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (stating that physician may factor out
other known risk factors for colon cancer such as family history and diet and
conclude that asbestos caused colon cancer in question and reversing grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants to allow such testimony).
172. See supra part II.B.2. (triggering judicial screening).
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answer these questions solely by looking at the record that the
plaintiff submits in response to the motion. The court needs
more information. In a case like Celotex in which the defendant
disputed that the plaintiff had been exposed to the defendant's
product, the court can review the depositions and other materi-
als that the plaintiff produced to assess whether the plaintiff
can produce admissible evidence at trial. The court, however,
should not be required to look at the epidemiological study on
which the plaintiffs expert relies and reach a conclusion about
its methodology and correctness in the absence of a record devel-
oped through the adversary process. Consequently, both sides
must have an opportunity for discovery.
Although shifting the burden to the plaintiff by simply
"pointing to the record" has a surface appeal-why should the
defendant expend resources if it has been haled into court by a
party unable to prove its case-the defendant will have no in-
centive to engage in discovery if it can support its motion with
affidavits and exhibits after the plaintiff has been forced to re-
veal its expert proof.173 Judges complain that experts are too
partisan. If so, the defendant should have little difficulty find-
ing an expert to provide a conclusory affidavit disagreeing with
the plaintiffs expert. Courts will then have to resolve the mo-
tion on materials that have not been tested through the adver-
sarial process, a procedure some judges have already
denounced,' 74 or they will have to spend valuable time holding
evidentiary hearings in connection with the motion.
Whether the summary judgment device was intended to
function as a "preliminary trial" is questionable.' 7 5 Trial by affi-
davit seems singularly inappropriate, however, as a means of
resolving cases that not only require an understanding of com-
plex scientific data, but often implicate intricate economic, socio-
logical, and political concerns.1 76 Celotex's authorization of
173. See Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary
Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 66 (1988) ("If defendants seek to
avoid the delay and expense of trial, at a minimum they must shoulder the
expense of doing sufficient discovery to show that the plaintiff does not have a
case. Discovery is as integral a part of the Federal Rules as summary judg-
ment. There is little merit in an interpretation of summary judgment proce-
dure that would encourage parties not to use the discovery rules, in hopes of
then invoking summary judgment to force an opponent to reveal his case.").
174. See supra note 118 and accompanying text and note 147.
175. See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on
the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 725, 740-41 (1989).
176. See Weinstein, supra note 104, at 472-76.
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"summary judgment as a substitute for trial"177 must be read in
conjunction with Daubert's recognition of the complex factors
that bear on "scientific knowledge" and its praise of the adver-
sary system in dealing with expert proof. Courts should avoid
granting motions for summary judgment unless the parties have
had a full opportunity and incentives to develop an adequate
record during the discovery phase. Consequently, courts should
require a motion in limine for admissibility objections to scien-
tific proof and impose on the defendant an initial burden of pro-
duction that insists on an affirmative demonstration of the
inadequacies of the plaintiffs proof.'78 The trial court will then
have an adequate record for making a Rule 56 determination,
and the appellate court will have a far more suitable record for
review.
5. Procedural Mechanisms for Avoiding the Re-Examination
of Scientific Issues
No discussion of procedural issues surrounding the admissi-
bility of expert scientific evidence in toxic tort cases can possibly
conclude without a glimpse at the mass tort context in which the
most complex and troubling interface of procedural and eviden-
tiary issues is presently occurring. Although inefficiencies re-
sult when courts repeatedly examine the same scientific issues,
mass aggregation of cases may accomplish efficiency at the ex-
pense of establishing greater scientific certainty.
a. The Discredited Expert
The Bendectin litigation provides a perfect example of a
toxic tort that various federal districts and state court systems
handled in numerous separate actions.179 Although the defend-
ants were ultimately successful in virtually all of the cases,' 80
courts could not use collateral estoppel to bind subsequent plain-
tiffs who were not parties to the prior proceedings and who had
177. Marcus, supra note 175, at 740.
178. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads:
The Impact of the Celotex Trilogy, 12 U. HAw. L. REV. 1, 23-26, 35-37 (1990)
(discussing the various Celotex opinions and fleshing out Justice Brennan's
framework).
179. See Sanders, supra note 7, at 396 (providing table summarizing yearly
totals of Bendectin related cases filed in the state and federal courts in the pe-
riod from 1977 to 1988).
180. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. As of this writing, the
Daubert case itself is still pending on remand.
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never litigated the causation issue.' 81 Consequently, courts re-
peatedly decided the same issues with regard to scientific evi-
dence, often offered by the same witness.
One possible consequence of the procedures suggested in
this Article, requiring adversarial exploration of defects in ex-
pert testimony in connection with motions in limine and sum-
mary judgment, is that courts might be able to deal more
effectively with the repeat witness who does not pass the test of
Rule 702. When the parties develop the methodological defects
underlying a proffered expert's opinions through cross-examina-
tion and the court provides the proponent adequate opportunity
to be heard before it excludes the expert's testimony, another
judge should be able to take judicial notice of the record from
these proceedings. 18 2 The second judge would in no way be
bound by the prior determination, but the losing party could be
directed that if it intends to proffer the same expert again it
must make a showing that the particular defects found by the
first judge either do not exist or have been cured.
b. Science in the Aggregated Case
Whether the mass tort litigation of the future will proceed
like the Bendectin cases is, however, questionable. The cost in
terms of time and money was immense, although not nearly as
costly as the asbestos litigation, that threatened to overwhelm
court dockets and resulted in the bankruptcy of many corpora-
tions.1 8 3 Courts are beginning to react to the enormous strain of
181. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (outlining re-
quirements for application of collateral estoppel).
182. The Federal Rules of Evidence authorize a court to take notice of facts
"not subject to reasonable dispute" because they are either "(1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned." FED. R. EvID. 201. Even if the other proceedings were held in a
different territorial jurisdiction, the record submitted on a motion in limine or a
summary judgment motion ought to fit into the second category. For cases in
which courts have taken judicial notice of other proceedings, see JACK B. WEiN.
STEiN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 1 WEiNsTE's EVIDENCE 201[03] n.28, at 201-
35 (Supp. 1993). For a thoroughly documented example of defective expert tes-
timony, see DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042,
1047-59 (D.N.J. 1992) (scrutinizing expert's affidavit and ultimately excluding
it while granting summary judgment in favor of defendant), affd mem., 6 F.3d
778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994).
183. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 129
B.R. 710, 932-55 (E.& S.D.N.Y. 1991) (exhibit estimating debtor's total expected
costs for pending asbestos litigation), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), mod-
ified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F.
Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (multi-districting 26,639 pending asbestos claims).
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these cases by increasing attention to efficiency tools, especially
those that permit aggregation of individual cases. 184 Some com-
mentators urge courts to concentrate as many cases as possible
in one forum as soon as possible, viewing such a strategy as the
key to effective resolution of the mass tort problem.' 8 5
When courts permit early aggregation, however, they may
find themselves ahead of the scientists. Until litigation begins
with regard to a particular product or substance, little research
may yet exist with regard to scientific questions that are critical
to the validity of the plaintiffs' claims. 186 Once the actions are
aggregated, scientific uncertainty exerts an enormous pressure
toward settlement. Neither side knows what answers future re-
search will yield; parties often need considerable time to study
particular issues, especially if they do not expect some claimed
possible disease consequences to become manifest until an ex-
184. See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to 'Litigation," 54 LAw & CoNTEmp.
PROBS. 5, 45 (Summer 1991) ("[Plerceptions have shifted. The debate in the
1990s, shaped by those working in mass tort cases, is not whether to aggregate
mass torts but what if any limits to impose."). Asbestos cases were not consoli-
dated until late in the litigation when the federal cases were finally multi-dis-
tricted. See Asbestos Prods., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991); Linda S.
Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass
Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 475, 478-79 (1991). On the other hand,
breast implant cases were multi-districted soon after the press began to report
on the magnitude of the problem. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992). Whether class actions are suit-
able for mass torts is currently the subject of considerable debate. As of this
writing, the breast implant cases appear to be moving toward a class action
settlement. Cf In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987) (upholding approval of class action settlement), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988); Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli, 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no case
or controversy and vacating district court's order certifying a mandatory limited
fund class action brought by a corporation on the verge of bankruptcy because
of asbestos injury claims).
185. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger et al., Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First
Century: A Panel Discussion, 19 BROoK. L. REv. 1199, 1206 (1993) ("One, as
almost a sine qua non for resolving these mass cases, there must be more and
more efforts at aggregation. If you don't have all the cases in one forum, woe
onto anybody trying to deal nationally with the phenomenon.") (statement of
Kenneth R. Feinberg). For suggested approaches, see A.L.I., COMPLEX LITiG.
PRoJEcT (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1 (Apr. 14, 1989); 2 (Apr. 6, 1990); 3 (Mar. 31,
1992)); MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL Jus-
TICE, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALuATION OF
AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES (1988) (Rand Note N-2805-ICJ) (setting forth
agenda for research program on mass litigation and reporting results obtained
to date); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Bal-
ancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. RE V. 877
(1987) (discussing class action litigation and proposals for its reform).
186. See Sanders, supra note 7, at 321-48.
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tended latency period expires.18 7 The huge potential risk and
transaction costs may drive the defendant to make the plaintiffs
a settlement offer.188 The parties may therefore seek to reach a
global legal resolution long before meaningful data from scien-
tific studies would be available about central questions such as
causation, exposure, and disease outcomes.
This scenario produces numerous complex issues that the
law has just began to address. Given scientific uncertainty,
when is it fair to a defendant to force some form of consolidation
on pending claims?18 9 How can one settle an aggregated pro-
ceeding if the extent of damages to future claimants is un-
known?190 How can one settle such a proceeding if the number
187. Some potential claims may involve injury to the next generation. For a
discussion of claims by grandchildren of women who took DES, see Margaret M.
Hershiser, Note, Preconception Tort Liability-The Duty to Third Generations:
Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1479 (1991); Marisa L. Mas-
caro, Note, Preconception Tort Liability: Recognizing a Strict Liability Cause of
Action for DES Grandchildren, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 435 (1991); John B. May-
nard, Note, Third-Generation-DES Claims, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 241 (1992); see
also Rebecca Weisman, Article, Reforms in Medical Device Deregulation: An
Examination of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 973, 973 n.3 (1993) (detailing medical problems associated with silicone
breast implants and specifically noting alleged problems of infants who nursed
from mothers with implants).
188. Steven Morris, Baxter Oks $556 Million Implant Settlement Share,
CHic. TRI., Feb. 15, 1994, at 1 (Business Section) (reporting on proposed $3.7
billion settlement of breast implant cases and quoting company spokesman who
stated that scientific research "has not established any link between breast im-
plants and disease").
189. See Debruyne v. National Semiconductor Corp. (In re Repetitive Stress
Injury Litig.), 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting consolidation of repetitive
stress injury cases as premature on the ground that claim of injury was so gen-
eral that it covers different ailments with a variety of possible causes and stat-
ing that "[t]he systematic urge to aggregate litigation must not be allowed to
trump our dedication to individual justice") (quoting In re Brooklyn Navy Yard
Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir. 1992)).
190. Cf. Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that Texas state court plain-
tiffs claiming Agent Orange injuries were bound by settlement in federal class
action suit that enjoined future litigation by class members and consequently
dismissing their state suit and upholding removal to federal court pursuant to
All Writs Act), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994). The court noted "serious
obstacles to recovery," id. at 1436, "despite continuing research, the crucial is-
sue of 'general causation,' i.e., whether any injuries are attributable to Agent
Orange, remains unsettled," id. at 1437.
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of future claimants is unknown? 191 Can one bind the unknown
future claimants through a class action?192
A central question in deciding these issues is the extent to
which present legal decisions should be conditioned on future
scientific developments. For instance, in settling a mass tort ac-
tion must funds be set aside for continued scientific research
into as yet unanswered latency issues? Must projections about
future claims be monitored and must the payouts be readjusted
periodically if the initial projections turn out to be skewed? Will
the results of further research be made public or kept confiden-
tial in the confines of the settlement?
It is too early, as yet, to predict with any certainty the ex-
tent to which the courts must protect future claimants by taking
account of future scientific knowledge. Too much insistence on
readjusting "final" resolutions in light of further scientific stud-
ies will impact on litigants' willingness to settle in the face of
unknown contingencies. 193 Conditional resolutions would also
impose additional costs on the court system by requiring judicial
supervision. 194 The difficulty of resolving these problems sug-
gests that aggregation procedures have the potential to force
questions of scientific knowledge to the periphery or even off the
191. See Weinstein, supra note 104, at 507-10 & n.164 (discussing future
claimants and detailing author's efforts to determine probable incidence of
claims against the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust through projec-
tions performed by court-appointed experts).
192. See Frederick M. Baron, Future Claimants Class Actions-Blueprint
for Disaster, 8 Mealey's Litig. Rep., Asbestos (Mealey Publications, Inc.) 20
(June 11, 1993) (commenting on proposed settlement of Carlough [now Geor-
gine] v. Amchem, Civ. Action No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa.), an asbestos settlement
involving the Center for Claims Resolution); cf Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 114 S. Ct. 56 (1993) (certify-
ing the question, in an anti-trust action, of whether a federal court may refuse
to enforce a judgment in a class action certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) on ground of absent class members' constitutional due process right to
opt-out of class action which asserts monetary claims on their behalf); writ dis-
missed as improvidently granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 4216, 4217 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1994)
(majority voted to dismiss because constitutional claim would be avoided if all
class actions seeking money must be brought pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) which
permits opt-outs; procedural posture of case prevented Court from considering
this issue; three dissenters wished to decide case because of importance of de-
ciding whether opt-out right is constitutionally required).
193. Defendants may be unwilling to risk potential unknown future claims
if future claimants cannot be bound. In limited fund cases, because of the po-
tential impact on legal fees, plaintiffs' lawyers will be leery of any settlement
that allows the percentage payments for present and future claimants to be
adjusted.
194. Indeed, given the possible latency period for some diseases, the life ex-
pectancy of the litigation might exceed that of the supervising judge.
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screen. If the courts ultimately allow class actions and other
forms of aggregation to dictate the resolution of future mass
toxic tort and product actions, then ironically Daubert may have
less of a role to play in the type of case in which the opinion
originated than in many other kinds of litigation before the
courts.
CONCLUSION
Daubert is an important case because it confirms the federal
trial judges' responsibility for the quality of science that enters
their courtroom. The prevalence of expert proof on scientific is-
sues means that the judges may be called upon to exercise a
gatekeeping role in many of their cases. Daubert is not, how-
ever, a self-executing opinion. Although the opinion is a litany
about rules-rules of civil procedure as well as evidence-ulti-
mately neither set of rules applies to many of the decisions that
will have to be made. To implement the suggestions of the
Supreme Court for analyzing scientific evidence, the courts will
have to devise procedures that will effectuate the Court's eviden-
tiary objective without sacrificing fairness and efficiency goals.
Although Daubert seems to be an opinion about evidence,
and evidence is commonly thought of as the rules that apply at
trial, Daubert's greatest impact, especially in civil cases will be
on pre-trial proceedings. Consequently, implementation of the
framework set out by the Supreme Court requires judicial atten-
tion to how the Daubert opinion intersects with discovery and
motion practice. It would be ironic if a leading opinion on the
law of evidence results in dispositions based on evidence that
has not been subjected to adversarial testing. The desire to dis-
pose of litigation efficiently must be balanced against the par-
ties' rights to have crucial determinations made upon adequate
records.
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